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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Santos Centeno appeals his sentence, arguing that the District Court abused its 
discretion in its consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors—specifically, by ignoring 
factors contained in the statute and considering factors outside it. We conclude that the 
District Court’s sentence was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable, and we 
therefore affirm.  
I.  
 Centeno participated in two violent assaults within one week against pedestrians 
walking in Philadelphia near the Independence National Historic Park. As a result of the 
first assault, the victim—a man who had approached Centeno and the group of men he 
was with to ask for help finding his car—suffered traumatic brain injury and required 
surgery to repair severe facial fractures and implant a metal plate in his face. He spent ten 
days in the hospital, weeks in rehabilitation, and months unable to work. As a result of 
the second assault—this time on a husband and wife leaving a restaurant after dinner—
the husband suffered blows to the face, head and back. Centeno punched the wife in the 
face and then, attempting to steal her pocketbook, dragged her across the sidewalk. After 
being treated in the hospital, she needed orthodontic work and two root canals because of 
damage from Centeno’s punch to her face. 
 In 2013, a jury convicted Centeno of aiding and abetting: assault resulting in 
serious bodily injury (18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6)), assault by striking, beating, or wounding, 
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(18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4)), and robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2111). At sentencing, the District 
Court applied the career offender enhancement and found that Centeno had a total 
offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of VI, resulting in a Guidelines range 
of 151–188 months. He was sentenced to 188 months of imprisonment, followed by three 
years of supervised release, restitution, a fine, and a special assessment cost. The District 
Court denied the Government’s motion for an upward variance because, though it found 
the Government’s argument compelling, it concluded that 188 months was sufficient. On 
appeal, this Court held that Centeno’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4) and (a)(6) 
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because (a)(4) (assault by striking) was a lesser 
included offense of (a)(6) (assault resulting in serious bodily injury).1 This Court vacated 
Centeno’s sentence on the lesser included offense and remanded for resentencing.2  
 Before the District Court resentenced Centeno, the Supreme Court decided 
Johnson v. United States.3 Under Johnson, the parties agree that Centeno no longer 
qualifies as a career offender. Therefore, at his resentencing in 2017, the District Court 
determined that Centeno’s total offense level was 25 and that he had a criminal history 
category of VI, resulting in a Guidelines range of 110–137 months. The District Court 
granted the Government’s motion for an upward variance and again sentenced Centeno to 
a total term of imprisonment of 188 months, basing its variance on Centeno’s criminal 
                                              
1 United States v. Centeno, 793 F.3d 378, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2015). 
2 Id. at 392. 
3 135 S. Ct. 2552 (2015). 
  
4 
history, his apparent proclivity for violence, and the random and vicious nature of the 
attacks. Neither party made a contemporaneous objection to the sentence.  
II.  
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Unpreserved claims of 
sentencing errors like Centeno’s are reviewed for plain error.4 Plain error “occurs when 
there is ‘(1) an error, (2) that is plain or obvious, and (3) that affects a defendant’s 
substantial rights.’”5 We review “all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or 
significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 
standard.”6 We defer to the sentencing court “unless no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the 
district court provided.”7  
III. 
The only issue on appeal is whether the District Court’s above-Guidelines 
sentence was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable. This issue incorporates 
the question of whether the District Court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors in 
its decision.  
                                              
4 Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133, 134–35 (2009). 
5 United States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80, 88 (3d Cir. 2018) (alteration omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
6 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007); see United States v. Tomko, 562 
F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009). 
7 Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. 
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To determine if there was plain error, we proceed in two steps.8 First, we examine 
whether the sentencing was free from procedural error, i.e., whether the district court 
calculated the correct Guidelines range, ruled on motions for departure from the that 
range, and considered the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).9 If there is 
no procedural error, we then review the sentence for substantive reasonableness.10  
The District Court here committed no procedural error. It correctly calculated the 
Guidelines range, gave both parties the opportunity to argue, and granted the 
Government’s motion for an upward variance. The court did not base the sentence on 
clearly erroneous facts; it considered the § 3553(a) factors and adequately explained its 
chosen sentence and its decision to exceed the Guidelines range.11  
Centeno’s argument that the District Court relied on inappropriate factors and did 
not adequately consider § 3553(a) factors fails. The District Court did not err in 
considering the random and violent nature of the attacks, the severity of the victims’ 
injuries, or the fact that Centeno’s criminal history surpassed the maximum criminal 
history accounted for by the Guidelines. Each of these considerations is grounded in the 
§ 3553(a) factors, namely “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 
and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need . . . to reflect the seriousness of the 
                                              
8 Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567–68. 
9 See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  
10 United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2017). 
11 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
  
6 
offense . . . [and] to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”12 The court 
made “an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.”13 Deciding to impose 
a sentence outside of the Guidelines, the court “consider[ed] the extent of the deviation 
and ensure[d] that the justification [was] sufficiently compelling to support the degree of 
the variance.”14 Because the District Court appropriately considered these items under the 
§ 3553(a) factors, it committed no procedural error. 
Having determined that there was no procedural error, we turn to the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence, considering the totality of the circumstances.15 In doing 
so, we “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, 
on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.”16 Centeno argues that the court’s sentence 
was not substantively reasonable because it did not consider the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct, as required by § 3553(a)(6). We first note that “[s]ince 
the District Judge correctly calculated and carefully reviewed the Guidelines range, he 
necessarily gave significant weight and consideration to the need to avoid unwarranted 
disparities.”17 The court also made clear that it was imposing a sentence outside of the 
                                              
12 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2).  
13 Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 51; Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. 
16 Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
17 Id. at 54.  
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Guidelines because of the “unique things about this case,”18 particularly the extreme 
randomness, the cruelty of the conduct, the significant harm caused (beyond the threshold 
of serious bodily injury), and Centeno’s extensive criminal history. These unique 
elements distinguish him from “defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct”19 and further indicate that the judge appropriately considered 
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Centeno’s conduct and history 
provided sufficient reason to conclude that a disparate sentence was warranted. 
The sentence was substantively reasonable because the District Court did more 
than recite the factors; “it detailed, step-by-step, its individualized assessment of the 
sentence that it believed appropriate in this particular case,” and provided reasons that 
were logical and consistent with the factors.20 The District Court did not commit plain 
error.  
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm Centeno’s sentence. 
                                              
18 App. 238.  
19 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). 
20 Tomko, 562 F.3d at 571. 
